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Introduction  
The majority of studies on the Middle East and North Africa concentrate on the 
factors that explain the absence and failure of processes of democratisation through 
variables that apply across the different countries rather than examining the nature of 
regime change in the region (Karatnycky, 2002). This is problematic because it tends to 
overlook the more relevant question of how all these regimes are able to survive and by-
pass the third wave of democratisation. Explanations based on rentierism (Beblawi and 
Luciani, 1987) cannot account for the politics of authoritarianism in oil-free countries 
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such as Morocco and Tunisia. Also, the support of the international community for Arab 
dictators (Ghalioun, 2004) cannot explain the survival of authoritarianism in states such 
as Syria and Iran. Finally, explanations based on Islam and Arab political culture (Lewis, 
2002) have proven very weak when tested (Stepan and Robertson, 2003).   
Thus, for an explanation that might be more satisfactory and applicable in a 
comparative context, scholars have begun to analyse in more detail the strategies and 
instruments of survival that incumbent authoritarian regimes have put in place (Brownlee 
2002a, 2002b). By far the most popular variable used to explain the ‘endurance’ of 
authoritarian rule in the region has been the strength of the ‘coercive apparatus’ available 
to the incumbents. Eva Bellin (2004, p. 140) suggests for example that ‘the solution to the 
puzzle of Middle Eastern and North African exceptionalism lies […] in present 
conditions that foster robust authoritarianism, specifically a robust coercive apparatus in 
these states.’ The ability of the ruling elites to set up a security apparatus that is both 
reliable and effective is due to a number of domestic and international factors ranging 
from fiscal health to external support. There are significant policy repercussions that stem 
from this analysis. In particular, the democratising strategies of international actors are 
unable to take into account the complex web of complicities that incumbents have put in 
place to gain domestic legitimacy, leading, as the Iraqi case demonstrates, to facile 
assumptions about regime change once the repressive actor is taken out of the equation.  
While there is very little doubt that the robustness of the coercive apparatus is a 
significant factor in the persistence of authoritarianism, this explanation suffers from a 
number of theoretical and practical shortcomings. This paper, building on the work of 
Dawisha and Zartman (1988) and Lust-Okar (2004) attempts to address these 
shortcomings by focusing on a specific aspect of these regimes’ survival: the ability to 
‘divide and conquer’ the opposition by pitting opposition movements against each other 
without resorting to coercion. Rather, co-optation of and selective rewards for sectors of 
the opposition have been and still are frequently utilised to consolidate authoritarian rule 
and fend off demands for democratic reforms. The contention of this study is that 
coercion alone cannot explain the endurance of authoritarianism and that regime survival 
depends to a significant degree on effective legitimacy. As argued by Albrecht and 
Schlumberger (2004): ‘blunt repression alone [cannot] account for the fact that no single 
Arab democracy has developed when all other world regions experienced democratic 
transitions.’ Within this context, the strategy of divide et impera does not solely apply to 
established political opposition (i.e. political parties), but has also invested the sphere of 
civil society (Albrecht, 2005; Sardamov, 2005; and Carapico, 2002). This has led some to 
question the theoretical validity of civil society as a pre-requisite for democratisation 
(Berman, 2003) and the policy-making effectiveness of funding civil society activism to 
provoke democratisation (Hawthorne, 2004). This paper explores the validity of the 
assumption that the same strategy applied in the past to neutralise the potential opposition 
of political parties is being utilised today with respect to civil society actors with the 
same degree of effectiveness and it contributes to strengthen the case for a better 
understanding of how authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa operate 
to guarantee their survival. This is an important aspect of politics in the region and an 
understanding of how civil society activism can be hijacked by the regime provides 
interesting lessons for both academics and policy-makers involved in the promotion of 
such activism as the way to democracy. The regime and all the different opposition actors 
struggle to control the space civil society provides and the novelty of this analysis resides 
in the teasing out of how this struggle is occurring in the Moroccan context.  
This study concentrates on the case of Morocco because the country has belonged 
almost since independence to the category of ‘liberalised autocracies’ (Brumberg, 2003), 
where the ruler has been consistently able to divide the opposition and pit some 
movements against others in order to retain full control over the political system by 
formally subscribing to some form of political pluralism. In addition, Morocco has 
witnessed a massive surge in the number of civil society actors and an impressive growth 
of civic activism since Mohammed VI came to power, which, in theory, should bode well 
for the democratisation of the country (Vermeren, 2004).  
Single case studies inevitably suffer from inherent weaknesses when it comes to 
generalise the findings, particularly because Morocco may simply represent one type of 
authoritarianism. However, the explanatory power of the argument is still present due to 
the broad similarities that many countries in the region share in terms of civil society 
growth, strength of Islamism, perceived rulers’ illegitimacy and degree of economic and 
social problems.    
 
 
The endurance of authoritarianism: beyond coercion 
 As mentioned in the previous section, drawing from insights on studies of 
revolution, Eva Bellin (2004, p. 139) gives a rather powerful and quite convincing 
explanation for the robustness of authoritarianism in the region. She argues that 
‘authoritarianism has proven exceptionally robust in the Middle East and North Africa 
because the coercive apparatus in many states has been exceptionally able and willing to 
crush reform initiatives from below.’ Her study details the variables which have an 
impact on such robustness and she finds that in the Middle East and North Africa all the 
conditions are present that make authoritarianism both viable and effective in impeding 
democratic change. Bellin’s contribution is particularly useful for two reasons. First of 
all, it shifts the attention away from what is considered the main opposition force in most 
countries: Islamist movements. There has in fact been a very strong tendency to 
concentrate on such movements and their ideology/actions to explain why the region has 
not yet gone through a process of democratisation. Thus, much work is produced 
attempting to figure out whether Islamist movements and parties can be considered 
democratic actors or anti-democratic ones and what the implications of such findings are. 
This has generated an endless and ultimately fruitless debate because it is quite difficult 
to a priori label any political movement as ‘democratic’ or ‘anti-democratic’ without an 
examination of the surrounding political and institutional arena. Brumberg (2002, p. 111) 
convincingly argues that ‘the challenge is not to figure out whether Islamism is 
“essentially” democratic versus autocratic […]. Instead, it is to see whether this or that 
Islamist group is acting within an hegemonic political arena […] or else within a 
competitive […] arena.’ Bellin’s work thus has the merit of re-focusing attention on the 
authoritarian state, its resources and its means to secure its survival.  
Secondly, Bellin’s work highlights the very important issue of political violence 
as a means for current ruling elites to remain in power. This aspect is only rarely 
underlined, partly because this type of violence is less spectacular than what Islamist 
terrorists are associated with and partly because the perpetrators of state coercion quite 
often share a ‘convergence of […] interests with Western strategies’ (Ghalioun 2004, p. 
128). The focus on violence and the use of coercive means contributes to better explain 
how opposition movements operate in such an environment.   
Bellin (2002) has elsewhere given a more nuanced account of what she calls the 
coercive apparatus encompassing for instance the use of arbitrary legal procedures to 
silence opposition figures, but the focus is still on the latent threat of violence from the 
regime to enforce its will. Such a focus suffers nonetheless from a number of 
shortcomings and if we want to fully understand what explains the persistence and the 
efficacy of authoritarian rule we need to address them. The first problem is the 
methodological over-reliance on a single variable. Thus, the importance of the coercive 
ability of the state and the extensive penetration of the security services in Middle Eastern 
societies should not be overestimated. While it is true, as Bellin points out, that these 
states spend substantial amounts of money to build up their security apparatus and that 
they exercise varying degrees of repression in order to counter domestic demands for 
reform, this cannot account for survival on its own. All authoritarian states need some 
legitimacy on the part of some sectors of society if they want to last, as pure coercion 
does not seem to be effective over a long period of time. According to Albrecht and 
Schlumberger (2004, p. 373), ‘the search for some form of legitimacy must be at the core 
of every regime-survival strategy in non-democratic societies.’  
 The second problem with the explanation that Bellin presents is the lack of 
evidence demonstrating how this coercive apparatus works and operates so efficiently 
within society. By simply arguing that it is robust and efficient, we have the impression 
that we are dealing with societies where there is a high degree of continuous violence. 
While this has been the case in Algeria since the cancellation of legislative elections in 
January 1992, this is the exception rather than the rule and other countries in the region 
have at most only gone through sporadic periods of low-intensity conflict (for instance 
Syria in the early 1980s and Egypt in the early 1980s and mid 1990s) or have known very 
little widespread violence (such as Jordan or Morocco). Thus, the main characteristics of 
the coercive apparatus seem to be harassment and punishment of individuals or small 
groups of opposition militants rather than the absolute control exercised by the security 
forces. The existence of an active civil society is for instance an indicator of the presence 
of an autonomous space where ordinary people can structure their interactions free from 
state’s interference (Cavatorta, 2006).     
 Thirdly, Bellin’s coercive apparatus seems to function because there is a very low 
level of political mobilisation in most of the MENA region and this gives the impression 
that we are dealing with very static and apathetic societies. This may not actually be the 
case, as civil society activism demonstrates (Norton, 1996). This energy for change may 
not be transmitted through traditional channels such as political parties and openly 
political associations, but this specific case of low-level mobilisation does not mean that 
other avenues to express opposition do not exist. For instance, political mobilisation can 
take the form of improving one’s behaviour to become a better Muslim (for members of 
very active Islamist associations) or through active community work with the objective of 
educating citizens or providing basic social services.  
 Finally, there seems to be a failure on Bellin’s part to conceive of coercion only as 
the method of last resort for ensuring the continuation of authoritarian rule. The use of 
physical violence and widespread intimidation are appropriate responses only when the 
very survival of the regime is threatened to the core, as it was in Algeria in 1991, and 
might not be the most rational response at all times. This is increasingly true in the 
current international environment, where, despite a significant convergence of interests 
between most rulers in the region and Western countries, large scale human rights abuses, 
widespread violence and coercion are likely to have a very high international cost for the 
perpetrators in terms of international legitimacy.          
Given these shortcomings, it is possible to see coercion as only part of the 
explanation for the persistence of authoritarianism. Such coercion is certainly present and 
functions as a very powerful threat for those who attempt to challenge the system, but it 
is possible to conceive of other strategies that authoritarian rulers employ to remain in 
power without resorting to coercive means. Thus, the strategy of co-optation and division 
of opponents to better control it should be analysed. The phenomenon of co-optation 
might actually be just as important as the use of coercion because it allows ruling elites to 
expand the base of their legitimacy while pre-empting true demands for reform. Political 
opponents, be they individuals or political parties, do not need to immediately be coerced 
into accepting the rules of the game, but can be cajoled into accepting positions of 
responsibility or can be given ‘legislative’ rewards on policies that they care about 
without undermining the system itself. There might in fact be a substantial degree of what 
might be termed ‘voluntary co-optation’ whereby groups and individuals are happy to be 
associated with the regime because such an association allows them to pursue their 
primary objectives. In this context co-optation becomes easier for the regime because 
there is a market for it. In the absence of strong political parties with an overarching 
project for reforming society, such a co-optation is much easier because, usually, civil 
society actors are driven by one-issue concerns.   
It follows that what is true for political parties and individuals can also be true for 
other sectors of society, be they social classes or ethnic groups or religious minorities. 
Co-optation does not obviously equate with power sharing and it does not challenge the 
fundamentals of the political order because the real wielders of power remain in full 
control of the political agenda and of the state institutions. Successful co-optation relies 
on a number of inducements that can be activated to obtain the desired result ranging 
from privileges of an economic nature to ones of a legal nature to ones of a personal 
nature. For example, the literature on the rentier state explains quite convincingly how 
ruling elites use external rents, where available, to buy off certain sectors of society by 
setting up a system of crony capitalism which makes members of the business elites, 
traditionally seen as a pro-democratisation class, a pillar of the authoritarian regime 
(Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). 
Given the considerable economic and social problems that most of the Arab world 
experiences and given the extent to which current regimes are under pressure to reform, 
the co-optation variable explains better than the coercion variable why such societies are 
not in constant violent turmoil.   
There is in fact a very long history of co-optation in the region, whereby certain 
sectors of society are awarded privileges in exchange for support or at least tacit assent to 
authoritarian rule. This stems from the fact that, far from being the unitary societies they 
purport to be, Arab states are not harmonious and are characterised by cross-cutting 
linguistic, ethnic, religious and class cleavages (Sadiki, 2002). In such a context, it is 
possible for authoritarian rulers to utilise these cleavages in such a fashion as to make co-
optation the primary strategy. It follows that for co-optation to function, a degree of 
‘coercion’ is certainly required, but repression is not the primary method for 
strengthening one’s authoritarian position: positive inducements and rewards can be just 
as effective. In addition, a degree of voluntary co-optation certainly exists.     
One very important aspect that needs further analysis is the role that the method 
of divide et impera plays within the larger mechanism of co-optation. Rulers in the 
MENA region have often experienced a rather high degree of opposition from different 
quarters since the major crises of legitimacy that began towards the end of the 1960s. At 
that time, and throughout the 1970s, the challenge coming from the revolutionary Marxist 
left was not simply defeated through massive repression, but was countered as well by 
letting the other major opposition movement (the Islamists) have more freedom of action 
and rewarding them with legislative changes that fit their agenda, as the conservative 
revision of the Family Code in Algeria in the mid 1980s shows. Given the very deep 
ideological antipathy that existed between Marxists and Islamists, a very powerful rivalry 
developed between the two movements, allowing the authoritarian ruler to exploit such 
divisions to consolidate his power by playing the super-partes arbiter. In Egypt, Sadat 
‘attempted to win the support of religious groups by lightening up restrictions on their 
political activity’ (Al Zayyat 2004, p. xvii) in order to counter the leftist challenge to his 
economic and international policies.  
 This manipulative tradition has successfully worked in more recent times in 
reverse, where secular and leftist groups have quite willingly tended to gravitate around 
the authoritarian leaders for fear of Islamism. This has permitted the ruling elites to 
survive almost unscathed the third wave of democratisation. Given that the Islamists have 
played the role of most significant opposition in the vast majority of the countries in the 
region over the last three decades, it has been quite easy for current rulers to rely on the 
strategy of divide et impera. Islamists movements and parties are feared not only by 
incumbents, but by other sectors of society as well, leading them to accept what is seen as 
the lesser of two evils: the incumbent. This is not only true for leftist and secular parties, 
but also for religious minorities (the Christians of Syria and Egypt) or for ethnic ones (the 
Kabyles of Algeria). What is worrisome for the spread of democracy in the region is that 
a large number of pro-democracy movements and pro-democracy intellectuals have been 
‘scared into’ embracing a police state in order not to face the possibility of an Islamist 
electoral victory. The willingness to be co-opted and to lend some sort of ‘reserved’ 
legitimacy to the incumbents has not been the product of coercion, rather of perceived 
irreconcilable ideological differences with Islamist parties. The primary objective of 
resisting the expansion of Islamism leads to voluntary co-optation, as the telling case of 
the Algerian feminist Khalida Messaoudi demonstrates. The ability of incumbents to 
exploit the Islamist card has permitted them to present themselves as the saviours of 
democracy precisely because nationally and internationally respected figures and political 
movements endorsed their rule as the price to pay to keep the ‘fachoislamistes’ out of 
power. Brumberg (2003, p. 111) convincingly argues that ‘in the Middle East […] fear of 
Islamist victories has produced “autocracy with democrats”, as key groups that might 
choose democracy, absent an Islamist threat, now actively support or at least tolerate 
autocrats.’ The support given by numerous pro-democracy secular liberal intellectuals 
and movements to the Algerian military for cancelling the 1992 elections through a 
military coup in order to avoid an Islamist victory is paradigmatic in this respect. 
What has worked at the domestic level has also worked well on the international 
stage, where authoritarian incumbents have benefited from Western support partly 
because they keep presenting themselves as the only alternative to the ‘uncivil forces’ of 
Islamism. Thus, Zakaria (2004, p. 2) can argue that ‘the Arab rulers of the Middle East 
are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant, and 
pluralistic than those who would likely replace them.’  
It therefore transpires that coercion is not the only explanatory variable that 
accounts for the persistence of authoritarianism in the MENA region. Incumbents have 
traditionally used a strategy of co-optation based on dividing and ruling the different 
opposition movements that challenged them. They performed this task over a number of 
decades and have been able to defeat the most important challenger of the time and 
remain in power. The reliance on such a strategy has paid off quite handsomely, as co-
optation has never gone beyond what it is: a method to exclude significant political 
change in the long-term. The nature of the different regimes has changed over time 
because the incumbents shifted their base of support throughout the decades, but the real 
wielders of power have not truly relinquished it to any of the actors co-opted over time. 
In this process, the real losers have been democratic procedures. Thus, ‘the resulting 
alliance between potential democrats and police states offers an inverted image of 
political reforms in Eastern Europe and the wider Third World’ (Brumberg 2003, p. 111), 
hindering the development of democracy in the MENA region. It is not surprising that 
today political parties in the Arab world are considered to be, at best, irrelevant and 
impotent.   
 
The Moroccan Makhzen 
 There is very little doubt that Morocco remains an authoritarian state and, in a 
recent interview, Moroccan constitutionalist Omar Bendorou (Le Journal Hebdomadaire 
April 2005, p. 28) confirmed that in light of the present constitution ‘all power is really in 
the hands of the King,’1 who is of course unelected. In spite of this, Morocco has always 
given the impression of embracing political pluralism. This means that the ruler permits 
some sort of political opposition, while retaining the last word on the most important 
issues affecting the country (Leveau, 1997). Thus, Morocco holds regular elections where 
competing parties are allowed to win seats in parliament, although the elected assembly 
does not have any substantial power. In addition, elections results are predetermined and 
they are designed to favour political parties that are either loyal or, at the very least, not 
hostile to the King (Morocco seems to have translated the concept of ‘loyal opposition’ 
into practice). This means that the government that is expression of such parties has very 
little room to manoeuvre because the King, according to the Constitution, has the power 
to appoint the most important ministers and chairs cabinet meetings (Willis 1999). His 
role and his position cannot be challenged also because the sovereign enjoys religious 
legitimacy as Commander of the faithful (imarat al mouminine), claiming to be a direct 
descendent of the Prophet Mohammed (Zeghal, 2005).  
 Thus, Morocco has been, since its independence, a paradigmatic neo-patrimonial 
state where the King has been able to become the ultimate arbiter of decision-making by 
utilising a mixture of coercion and co-optation. In fact, the emphasis on coercion as the 
primary instrument to remain in power does not fully explain the persistence of 
authoritarianism in the country. This does not mean that coercion has not been employed 
at times in a rather extensive manner to subdue recalcitrant opposition. Under Hassan II’s 
reign, political opponents were physically eliminated, others languished in prison and 
social repression of dissent was widespread. Thus, a very heavy atmosphere characterised 
periods of post-independence political life in Morocco (Perrault 1990) and the country 
has been for a long time ‘an authoritarian state that kept people in line by intimidation 
and abuse’ (Howe 2001, p. 59).  
 However, this was not the only method that Hassan II employed to consolidate his 
power. He was to give the impression of political pluralism precisely because over time 
he co-opted large sectors of the opposition, particularly political parties; a strategy 
already used by his predecessor Mohammed V. As Holden (2005, p. 23) argues, ‘beyond 
the formal system, power ha[s] been exercised by the Makhzen (ruling elite centred 
around the throne) through patronage.’ The true role of political parties in the Maghreb 
has been explained by Willis (2002, p. 4): ‘rather than controlling the state, they 
themselves are controlled by the state.’ In the case of Morocco there is much evidence to 
support the hypothesis that political parties function simply as providers of legitimacy for 
the incumbents and as avenues of control of popular attitudes. Since independence, the 
ruling sovereign has practised a strategy of ‘divide et impera’ by, for instance, 
‘sponsoring the creation of a new party with the intention of undermining support for an 
existing political party’ (Willis 2002, p. 4) perceived to be a threat. In addition, referring 
to the other North African states as well, Willis (2002, p. 4) argues that ‘regimes interfere 
in the internal affairs of individual parties by playing on existing divisions within them 
sponsoring rifts and splits’ and guarantee important and well paid posts to opposition 
figures prising them away from the ranks of political parties.  
This strategy has been a constant of the Moroccan political system. For example, 
much like in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the radical Marxist left 
posed a serious challenge to the throne in the 1960s and 1970s. The Socialist party and its 
leaders, the students’ movements and sectors of the trade unions seriously contested the 
rule Hassan II exercised and posed a serious threat to the regime, but, through a mix of 
coercion and divide et impera, Hassan was able to contain the challenge. As part of the 
strategy of dividing the opposition, the King encouraged for instance the growth of 
Islamism to counter the growth of Marxism. Through his religious legitimacy, he 
permitted greater scope of action and political involvement to Islamist associations such 
as the Al Islah Wa Attajdid because it would contest the political space to the left. In the 
words of a former political prisoner, ‘Islamism has grown considerably in Morocco, and 
this is also because it was encouraged to do so by King Hassan II to challenge the rise of 
the Marxist left. This had led to confrontations, for instance in schools, among Islamists 
and leftists’ (interview with author, 2005). In this respect, Hassan II was able to put 
himself above these disputes and become the sole arbiter in a situation of social conflict. 
Again, a former dissident confirms: ‘the King cannot be above the parties, he has to be 
the ultimate arbiter [of their disputes]. This is how Hassan conceived of his role’ 
(interview with author, 2005). In a sense, permitting a degree of pluralism and therefore a 
confrontation of policies and ideas allows the Monarchy to be the ultimate decision-
maker because the different parties are unable to reach a compromise on a number of 
issues due to their lack of control on the levers of power. The strategy paid off and was 
utilised again when the domestic threat changed from the Marxist left to political Islam.  
Contrary to the expectations of some (Munson 1991), Islamism had become by 
the early 1990s the most significant ideological opposition to the King and it still 
represents its most significant challenge today. In particular, the Jamiat al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
led by Sheikh Yassine is very vocal in its opposition to the authoritarianism of the 
monarchy.2 Thus, in order to counter the Islamist threat, coercion was certainly used by 
Hassan II, as the imprisonment of Sheikh Yassine in the early 1970s demonstrates, but 
co-optation was also employed later on. In particular, the King in 1997 used the fear of 
the Islamist ideological and political project to entice the Socialist party into accepting 
what seemed an innovative political compromise: l’ alternance, whereby the King 
promised that the Socialist party’s leader would become the Prime Minister and have the 
opportunity to lead the country’s government following free and fair elections.  
This seemed to launch a democratising era in Morocco’s political life, although 
the King maintained strict control over the most important departments and policies, 
leading to the powerlessness of the government and reinforcing the royal palace. Thus, 
the choice of the Socialist party to participate backfired on the party itself, as its 
experience in power discredited it even further with the electorate. At the same time, the 
King permitted the participation in the political system of a moderate Islamist formation, 
the PJD, with ‘the expectation that it [would] undermine and attract support away from’ 
(Willis 2002) the Jamiat. In turn, the Jamiat is quite critical of the PJD’s decision to 
participate in what it sees as a ‘worthless rigged game’ (interview with the author, 2005). 
From this emerges a much more complex picture than the one painted by those who 
argue that blunt coercion is the glue that keeps the political system together.  
Morocco is a significant example of the mixed strategies incumbents utilise to 
remain in power and highlights how processes of supposed democratisation are under the 
strict control of the wielders of power.  
King Hassan’s death and the access to the throne of his son Mohammed VI in 
July 1999 seemed to usher in a new era of democratic reforms that would further 
liberalise society and the political system. There is no doubt that Mohammed VI has 
made a considerable amount of changes overt the last few years and that Morocco has 
become a far less repressive country. The new King initiated ‘a dynamic of change’ (Le 
Journal Hebdomadaire September 2005, p. 97) and while his liberalising record is, 
according to some (Vermeren 2005), mixed, a recent special issue of the magazine 
Telquel highlighted 100 reasons for Moroccans to be optimistic about their future. In the 
analysis of where Morocco stands today, the editors emphasised eighteen different 
political measures taken by the King that go in the direction of making Morocco a 
modern, more democratic society (Tequel 2005).3 This change has not gone unnoticed by 
some dissidents and political opponents of Hassan II, who argue that under the new 
sovereign ‘a lot of things have truly changed and that the pace of change has been good. 
Society in general is a lot freer. A lot of ‘old faces’ at the top have disappeared and have 
been replaced by educated young Moroccans who have the ability and the honesty that 
the previous generation did not have’ (interview with author 2005). As another put it: ‘the 
King has not been able to fully tackle economic underdevelopment, but the political 
atmosphere is certainly very different from the times of Hassan II. There is a sense of 
“liberalism” that has invested society’ (interview with author 2005). 
 Despite the introduction of some important progressive reforms such as the new 
family code and the symbolism that the dismissal of figures associated with the previous 
era of repression represents, the new King has certainly maintained full control over the 
political system and policy-making. In fact, it can be argued that Morocco’s 
democratization has stalled since the late 1990s (Cavatorta 2005). During this time, 
coercion and brutal repression have however not been the primary reason for the 
endurance of the incumbent and the new King seems to have mastered the art of co-
optation and ‘divide and rule.’ The strong reliance on divide et impera measures is due, 
mainly, to two factors. On the one hand, Moroccan society needed to breathe some fresh 
air, as it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain such strict control over it. 
Hassan II understood this and he introduced liberalising reforms that have picked up pace 
under Mohammed VI. On the other hand, the international community has become much 
more reluctant to turn a blind eye on widespread repression and human rights abuses in 
countries that are privileged partners on the international scene. All this has therefore led 
the sovereign and his advisers to rely almost completely on a strategy of survival based 
on the perception of the King’s indispensability through careful manipulation and 
management of the country’s political and social actors. As mentioned above, political 
parties have been co-opted for some time and emptied of their significance because they 
do not play at all the same role that they perform in established democracies; quite the 
contrary. Most ordinary citizens believe that political parties are discredited and cannot 
be agents for change. According to leading activists in the civil society movement: 
‘parties are completely discredited, they suffer from both an internal democratic deficit 
and excessive personalism’ (interview with author 2005). In this context, the King 
appears to be the only political actor who can rise above the petty infighting and 
squabbles that characterise the Moroccan party system. The only political party that 
might challenge the King, the Islamist PJD, exercises a form of self-censorship and 
deliberately chose not to do well at the 2002 elections for fear of regime reprisals (Willis 
2004). The state of the party system has led to the depoliticisation of the Moroccan 
citizenry, allowing the King to appear as the only dynamic and active actor, who needs to 
be ‘left alone’ to work for the improvement of the country (Maghraoui 2002).  
Mohammed VI’s success in remaining in power and continuing to be perceived as 
indispensable for a democratization that never seems to lead to the establishment of a 
system truly based on popular mandate is also due to his ability to play on the divisions 
that characterise the burgeoning civil society sector. 
 Some of the literature on democratisation contends that civil society activism is of 
fundamental importance for any process of democratisation and that in the absence of a 
formal political opposition organised around political parties (as was the case for instance 
in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s) civil society organisations can take 
on the role of effective opposition and enter into a bargaining game with the incumbent 
authoritarian ruler and force them to democratise the system. As Entelis (1996, p. 46) put 
it: ‘without a well developed civil society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to have an 
atmosphere supportive of democracy.’ Accordingly, there has been much enthusiasm 
focusing on the surge of civil society activism following the ending of restrictions in the 
late 1990s. Indeed, Morocco has witnessed the arrival on the scene of numerous 
organisations concerned with issues ranging from rural development to human rights to 
more specific women’s rights to social exclusion. The vast majority of these 
organisations do not have explicit political objectives, but the issues they care about have 
an indirect influence on how policy-making is structured and therefore their work has 
profound consequences on how the royal palace deals with them. Such activism has not 
however led to an acceleration of the process of democratisation nor to a weakening of 
the authoritarian set-up. Given the multitude of social, political and economic problems, 
some predicted that the King was ‘rendering his throne fragile to such an extent that he 
risks losing it’ (Tuquoi 2001, p. 316) but the evidence does not seem to support this 
analysis. The activism of civil society on a number of fronts and the pressure of their 
demands has, paradoxically, strengthened the King’s grip on power. After having 
continued in the manipulation of the party system to serve the interests of the Crown in 
the tradition of his father, the King has been able to do the same with civil society for a 
number of reasons. 
 First of all, the King has played on the profound differences that exist between the 
secular and the Islamist sectors of civil society activism. Far from being the civil society 
that many secular liberals in Europe and in the United States would want it to be, civil 
society in the Middle East and North Africa is largely Islamist. This is not only a problem 
for the regime, but an opportunity as well because it allows the incumbent to replicate the 
strategy adopted in the formal political arena. Thus, the King has been very active in 
promoting reforms that are very dear to Moroccan liberal elites such as the reform of the 
family code aimed at granting legal equality to women in order to provoke a negative 
reaction from some conservative Islamist associations. By pushing this agenda, he has 
secured a high degree of legitimacy with NGOs involved in making these demands such 
as ‘Springtime for Equality’ (a feminist association) or the CIOFEM while exposing vast 
sectors of Islamism as regressive for opposing the reform. This type of strategy is 
destined to separate the opposition and has so far worked quite well. In an interview a 
high-ranking member of  a leading human rights group, this point emerged quite strongly. 
He affirmed that: ‘the rise of Islamsim represents a danger for democracy in Morocco 
because the vast majority of them does not believe [sic] in the universal values of 
representative democracy’ (interview with author 2005). The outcome of this strategy is 
that the King comes to represent the indispensable figure through which the objectives 
that some secular liberal NGO’s have can be achieved and while this may represent a 
victory in the short-term, it also solidifies unequal power relations. 
 Secondly, the King has not only succeeded in dividing the Islamist and liberal-
secular camps, but he has also managed to divide each camp to control it better. The 
clearest example of this is the strategy employed to exploit the differences that exist 
among Islamist associations. Not only has Mohammed VI been able to lure into the 
political system a moderate Islamist party, but he also plays on the theological differences 
and personal rivalries that characterise two of the largest Islamist associations: the Jamiat 
al-adl led by Sheikh Yassine and the Tariqa Boutchichiya led by Sheikh Hamza. There is 
very little doubt that the ‘attitude towards Moroccan Islamism will condition the 
democratic future of the country’ (Jamai 2005, p. 3) and dealing with the phenomenon is 
of particular importance.  In order to marginalise what most analysts consider the most 
popular, uncompromising, best organised and most vocal opponent of the monarchy (the 
Jamiat al-Adl), it is not only necessary to permit the existence in parliament of an 
Islamist party that would sap support for Sheikh Yassine by integrating the system, but it 
is imperative to also compete at the societal level to weaken its appeal to the religious 
setcors of society.. Thus, the monarchy entertains privileged relations with the Tariqa and 
its leaders. This alliance is possible because the Tariqa does not challenge the imarat al 
mouminine and does not believe that the association should be directly engaged in 
politics, but should instead only be concerned with the betterment of the individual 
members. The King therefore supports the Tariqa in order to strengthen his religious 
legitimacy and to have privileged access to the religious bourgeoisie that the association 
represents. In exchange, the Tariqa enjoys freedom from scrutiny and, occasionally, 
obtains political favours like the royal appointment of the leader’s son to the post of 
governor of the Berkane province (Le Journal Hebdomadaire February 2005). The Jamia 
al-Adl is much more radical in that it refuses to be co-opted into the system and believes 
that the monarchy should at least retreat from active politics if not disappear completely 
in order for Morocco to become a republic. With respect to the PJD, the spokesperson of 
the Jamiat had this to say: ‘theirs is a hypocritical stance because they participate in 
government. They are just pretending to be in opposition to the ruler; in reality they are 
fully part of the Makhzen’ (interview with author 2005). 
 Thirdly, the King has decided to enter civil society through the creation of 
organisations and foundations that are formally independent, but are in actuality 
connected to the royal palace and dependent on it for funding. Given that raising funds is 
‘probably the most significant difficulty that the sector encounters’ (interview with author 
2005), the cash rich foundations that the King sponsors have the ability to penetrate civil 
society and show the general population that the King cares about their wellbeing. In fact, 
most of the charities established by the palace deal with issues such as rural poverty, 
urban regeneration and human development initiatives. This strategy again is aimed, on 
the one hand, at containing the Islamists on the terrain they privilege (social services) 
and, on the other, at providing funds for organisations that will inevitably gravitate 
politically around the palace.   
 In recent times, it was hoped and argued that Islamists and ‘true democrats’ of 
secular, liberal leanings would be able to finally strike up some sort of alliance to make 
democratic demands on the incumbents. Their alliance would fulfil the conditions that 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1987) talked about in their seminal work on transition to 
democracy and some researchers have indeed begun to analyse the changes taking place 
within Islamism in order to make it more conducive to undertake political actions within 
a pluralist context, while others have concentrated their attention on secular groups and 
their attitudinal changes towards Islamism. The logic of this is that, given the constraints 
they face in operating in authoritarian environments, they suffer from the same 
difficulties (Cavatorta 2006). Also, they both reject the way power is exercised by 
unelected authoritarian elites. There should therefore be room for a tactical alliance. This 
is possibly taking place in some countries, as the case of Egypt seems to indicate (Abdel 
Latif 2005). In the case of Morocco however the evidence seems to suggest that the 
country is quite a long way from witnessing the same process of rapprochement that 
Egypt is apparently experiencing between the different sectors of the opposition.  
 There is a degree of co-operation between Islamist associations and secular ones 
on certain matters such as campaigns for the better treatment of prisoners, for an end to 
torture or for more press freedom, but these are very selective issues. Both sets of actors 
recognise this as an important step, but it is not envisaged for the moment to take these 
initiatives to a different level, where the demands for change would be more systematic. 
In fact, when asked about the possibility of the occurrence of an Egyptian scenario on the 
alliance between secular and Islamist associations, the Jamiat coolly answered: ‘at this 
moment in time no’ (interview with author). Key figures in the associational movement 
in Casablanca gave the same type of answer.  
 Far from weakening the monarchy, the activism of civil society constitutes an 
asset for the King because the ideological differences that exist within the NGO sector 
and the diversity of issues they represent can be utilised to pick partners and rivals 
according to the changing situation. Thus, the promotion of the family code reform has 
guaranteed the King the support of large sectors of the urban secular elites, who have 
become even more afraid of Islamism because the Jamiat for instance opposed such 
reform. In addition, the lack of a truly responsive and functioning party system means 
that lobbying from civil society has to target the monarch rendering him indispensable if 
change is to be made on the issue that a given NGO is interested in promoting. This 
indispensable role, ‘sacralised’ in certain cases by the religious legitimacy the monarch 
enjoys, further strengthens his grip on the executive.  
Conclusion 
  The findings from the examination of Morocco in the context of the persistence 
of authoritarianism contribute to a better understanding of the endurance of such 
phenomena and, while generalisations from one case study should not be made, it 
indicates trends that might be applicable to other countries in the region and authoritarian 
regimes across the globe.  
 First of all, Morocco shows quite clearly that blunt repression is by no means the 
sole strategy that incumbents employ to remain in power. The hypothesis that co-optation 
and ‘divide and rule’ play a significant if not decisive role is borne out, particularly over 
the last decade when the costs of repression for authoritarian leaders have increased 
substantially due in particular to external constraints. The ability of the Moroccan 
monarchy to play on the differences that characterise the political opposition is beyond 
doubt and is due mainly to the presence of political Islamism, which has a contentious 
and divisive nature. While it is true that strategies of divide and rule have always been 
central to all political systems in the Middle East and North Africa, the case of Morocco 
demonstrates clearly how the strategy has been refined over the course of the last few 
years when, supposedly, a certain degree of liberalisation has occurred.    
 Secondly, Morocco shows that a new ruler is not necessarily going to employ 
tactics that will undermine his own power. Mohammed VI was hailed as a potential 
liberator, a democratiser and as the King of the Poor, but he has instead shown quite 
considerable skill in manipulating the opposition and in strengthening his own rule. His 
success resides on having increased the degree of pluralism in the country while at the 
same time retaining this position as the ultimate decision-maker.  The regime may have 
changed to some extent, but it remains authoritarian in nature.   
 Thirdly, the case of Morocco confirms what Vickie Langohr (2004) and 
Wictorowicz (2000) hypothesised when analysing the role of civil society in the region. 
Far from being a factor of democratisation, civil society activism seems to represent a 
golden opportunity for the incumbent to strengthen his position by further weakening 
political parties and by making social change dependent on access to him. Some civil 
society actors recognise this. One representative of a leading NGO openly admitted that 
this type of institutional arrangement with the King at head of a liberalised autocracy is 
likely to continue for a long time, while another stated that: ‘the problem is that we need 
political parties and their voice, but not these parties’ (interview with author 2005) if 
democratic reforms are to be introduced seriously and systematically.  
 However, the outlook may not be as bleak as it might appear from this analysis 
precisely because the reforms Mohammed VI introduced may have unforeseen 
consequences, particularly at civil society level. There is for instance the realisation that 
the success of civic activism is very much King-dependent and that this has in turn rather 
negative consequences for radical change at systemic institutional level. The very 
realisation of this on the part of activists might actually be the first step towards a change 
in behaviour vis à vis the royal power. Given that the repressive option is increasingly 
difficult to use, this has important consequences. There are indications that co-operation 
between very different groups is taking place and, while this has yet to lead to formal 
shared demands on the regime, this option is not as remote as it was a decade ago. Divide 
et impera is still very effective, but for how long?  
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